The economic value of additional airport departure capacity by Gurtner, Gérald et al.
The economic value of additional airport departure
capacity
Ge´rald Gurtnera,∗, Anne Grahama, Andrew Cooka, Samuel Cristo´balb
aSchool of Architecture and Cities, University of Westminster, 35 Marylebone Road,
London NW1 5LS, United Kingdom
bThe Innaxis Foundation and Research Institute, Calle de Jose´ Ortega y Gasset, 20, 28006
Madrid, Spain
Abstract
This article presents a model for the economic value of extra capacity at an
airport. The model is based on a series of functional relationships linking the
benefits of extra capacity and the associated costs. It takes into account the
cost of delay for airlines and its indirect consequences on the airport, through
the loss or gain of aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues. The model is
highly data-driven and to this end a number of data sources have been used. In
particular, special care has been used to take into account the full distribution
of delay at the airports rather than its average only. The results with the simple
version of the model show the existence of a unique maximum for the operating
profit of the airport in terms of capacity. The position of this maximum is
clearly dependent on the airport and also has an interesting behaviour with the
average number of passenger per aircraft at the airport and the predictability
of the flight departure times. In addition, we also show that there exists an
important trade-off between an increased predictability and the punctuality at
the airport. Finally, it is shown that a more complex behavioural model for
passengers can introduce several local maxima in the airport profit and thus
drive the airport towards suboptimal decisions.1
1. Introduction
A number of major airports in Europe are already under stress due to high
volumes of traffic during peak times [21]. Since traffic in Europe is expected
to grow by 50% in the next 20 years [17], it is expected that many other air-
ports will be severely congested in the medium term, and that airports that
are currently congested at peak times will have problems all day long. As a
consequence, the major European public-private research partnership SESAR
(Single European Sky ATM Research) has dedicated an Operational Focus Area
∗Corresponding author
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(OFA05.01.01) to the development of the Airport Operations Center (APOC)
to consider mitigation measures to avoid large delays at these airports and the
associated costs.
Delays are a direct consequence of levels of congestion at airports. These
impact directly on the airlines. For these, delays usually mean sub-optimal levels
of operation, as well as decreased satisfaction of their customers, leading to
potential decreases of market share. The value of this shortfall can be evaluated
for different types of airline, aircraft, and delay duration, etc. [12].
However, it is clear that expanding the capacity of an airport is costly.
Depending on the nature of the bottleneck and the severity of the congestion,
the airport might need to physically expand its infrastructure. This could mean,
for example, increasing the number of runways, the number of terminals, or the
number of gates. In all cases, the total operating costs for the airport will be
higher after the expansion. As a result, there will be an optimal capacity for
the airport which balances the level of congestion with the costs associated with
the extra capacity.
This is the concept which is explored in this paper, using a simple model to
capture this effect. More specifically, the model aims to provide some quanti-
tative measures of the cost of capacity and the corresponding cost of delay in a
very data-driven way. To this end, different types of data have been collected
that guide the modelling process and allow for detailed calibration.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the literature
review, focusing on the main mechanisms that should be included in the model.
The types and sources of data used are also discussed. Section 3 presents the
model in detail, including the calibration process. Section 4 provides some
results obtained with the model. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. State of the art
2.1. Literature review
Many studies have been undertaken concerning various aspects of airport
economics over the past few years and in this section a concise overview of
the most relevant research is provided. In particular, consideration is given to
the main mechanisms that link capacity to cost and delay, and the associated
strategies adopted by airports over the years.
Since a significant part of an airport’s operating costs is fixed, excess capacity
will produce high overall unit costs, as the fixed costs will be spread over lower
than optimal traffic levels. Whilst attempts may thus be made to use the current
facilities as much as possible, to take advantage of economies of density or
capacity utilisation [35], being close to capacity is likely to produce more delays.
So both capacity utilisation and delays can have an impact on airport cost
efficiency [37], with [2] empirically finding that the positive impact of utilisation
is greater than the negative impact of delays.
Delays have impacts for both passengers and airlines [12]. As passenger
satisfaction may be linked to commercial spend – the money spent by passengers
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– at the airport [3], delays can have a direct negative impact on an airport’s
performance, although this relationship is yet to be confirmed [36] due to very
limited research. This in turn is due to the lack of appropriate and publicly
available passenger satisfaction data. On the other hand, higher delays at the
airport may have the opposite effect, since passengers have more time to use the
commercial facilities [14], even though the only known empirical study in this
area found no significant relationship between commercial revenues and delayed
flights [20].
Adapting airport capacity to the expected level of traffic is a complex task
and many possibilities are discussed in the literature. First, so-called ‘soft’ man-
agement approaches have been examined. These include minor modifications to
management processes at the airport, without having an impact on the infras-
tructure itself. They are quick to implement and relatively low cost, but clearly
limited in scope. They can relate to strategic planning or tactical adjustments
[4]. They can also include more local solutions, such as improvement planning
[15, 25], changes to air traffic control (ATC) rules, price changes, and incentive
schemes for airlines to use larger aircraft – given that the infrastructure for
this is already in place – even if this may lead to additional congestion in the
terminals [21, 6]. In the broader sense, they include developing intermodality
with high-speed trains, diverting traffic or using multi-airport systems [33], even
though these typically require at least some infrastructure change.
The feasibility and effectiveness of using pricing to manage congestion has
been frequently discussed in the literature, with the theoretical arguments sum-
marised by [45]. However, such practices have rarely been applied and tested.
One of the key issues is the extent to which airlines already self-internalise con-
gestion, on which point views vary [9]. Moreover, [2] empirically found that
delays had no impact on aeronautical revenues but that this was significantly
higher at congested airports. Other research has shown that it is important to
take into account different passenger types when assessing the efficiency of any
potential new pricing scheme. Unsurprisingly, passengers having a higher value
of time – typically corresponding to business-purpose passengers – will benefit
from increased charges during peak times to protect them from the congestion
caused by passengers with lower values of time [13, 44]. Such pricing solutions
are also difficult to implement because many airports are subject to economic
regulation, most commonly in the form of a price-cap [1]. Another alternative,
but related, demand-management technique frequently studied in the literature
is a type of reform of the current slot allocation process, for example by using
slot auctions and secondary trading systems. This would have a major impact
on airlines and passengers, but most likely a lesser impact on airport revenues
[30, 40].
The second possibility to cope with excess demand is to change the infras-
tructure itself, usually by extending the current number of terminals, runways,
gates, etc.: so-called ‘hard’ management approaches. These measures are usu-
ally slow to implement and very costly, but can bring great increases in capacity
in some way or another. There will be a significant lag between the potential
expansion decisions and the full released capacity, during which demand and
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the environment may change. This introduces a complex dynamic behaviour of
development and investment, which in part creates a demand for more flexible
solutions [29, 27]. It also poses the problem of the risk aversion of the airport
operators, and, more generally, the problem of how expectations are formed
with regard to the likely investment return. Some research points out that the
various uncertainties in the airport system, including the uncertainty of future
demand [43] and the unpredictability of degradation [16], increase the difficul-
ties of airport capacity decision-making processes. Moreover, as airports are
not isolated entities, airline network (delay propagation) effects can add further
complexity to the validity of a capacity extension [12]. The decision-making
process of the airport under various uncertainties is a complex subject, as noted
in [39, 26].
The literature also points out the need for more subtle definitions of capac-
ity, in particular ensuring that there is differentiation between arrival versus
departure capacity, and runway versus terminal capacity. It has been shown
that there is some trade-off between the former [22], and that there exist some
non-trivial relationships between the latter [41]. Currently, runways typically
represent the bottleneck for the traffic flow, rather than terminals [21, 6, 42, 10].
There is also the trade-off between operational and commercial capacities, the
extent of complementarity between these two, and the associated cost alloca-
tion approaches [46, 14]. This is linked to the flexibility allowed within each
individual airport economic regulatory system and subsequent incentives which
may arise [24].
A common research theme concerns cost-benefit analyses examining the im-
plications of a ‘hard’ modification. In particular, it is important to emphasise
that changing infrastructure may not merely affect the volume of traffic or pas-
sengers, but also the nature of the traffic and operations at the airport. Indeed,
larger airports are usually more diversified in being able to provide a greater
range of commercial facilities. As a consequence, commercial spend can in-
crease disproportionately with the size of the airport. Also, leisure passengers
have been shown to spend more than business passengers [20, 11], and low-cost
carrier (LCC) passengers less [28]. Traffic mix changes will also bring different
associated costs related to the service expectations of the airlines, related, for
example, to ensuring a fast transfer time at hub airports, or swift turnarounds
for LCCs. As regards airport size, much mixed evidence exists, but generally
it shows that airports experience cost economies of scale, albeit with different
findings related to if, and when, these are exhausted, and whether diseconomies
then occur. For UK airports some research has estimated that long-run aver-
age costs decreased up to 5 million passengers, were constant for 5-14 million
passengers, and then started to increase [8], whereas another UK study [31]
found a steep decrease in average costs until around 4 million passengers and
then very moderate, but persistent decreases in costs until at least 64 million
passengers. Meanwhile, for Spain it has been concluded that cost economies are
not exhausted at any level of traffic for the airports considered [34], with similar
results confirmed for a worldwide sample [32]. These studies considered both
operating and capital (i.e. long-run) costs.
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A key related issue is how aeronautical charges may change as the result of
the costs of new infrastructure. However, it has been shown that aeronautical
revenues are very much influenced by market-oriented factors, such as price sen-
sitivity or competition [5, 7], as well as pure cost drivers. The impact of changes
in charges may also be limited, since they tend to represent a small portion of
the airline costs. This also depends on the extent to which airlines will absorb
such changes or pass them on fully to passengers [38], which is difficult to eval-
uate without further empirical evidence.
This literature review has provided a high-level overview of the airport sys-
tem, in particular with regard to relevant variables and the relative importance
of the various effects that need to be considered. This helps with informing and
building the model itself, which is presented in Section 3.
2.2. Data sources and usage
A large range of data sources has been used for the current research, as
presented in Table 1. The year of reference was chosen to be 2014, which was
the most recent available year of data across the different sources.
A major input was airport financial and operational data sourced (through
subscription) from FlightGlobal (London, UK). ATRS (Air Transport Research
Society; USA and Canada) benchmarking study data were purchased, in ad-
dition, particularly for the provision of complementary data on airports’ costs
and revenues. At the time of analyses, only ATRS data for 2013 were avail-
able, and these selected data were used as a proxy for 2014, after checking their
validity for this. Financial and operational data were compared with in-house,
proprietary databases, with adjustments made as necessary. Data on airport
ownership, and additional data on passenger numbers, were provided by Air-
ports Council International (ACI) EUROPE (Brussels). European traffic data
were sourced from EUROCONTROL’s Demand Data Repository (DDR) with
delay data primarily from the Central Office for Delays Analysis (EUROCON-
TROL, Brussels). Note that, whilst pure turnaround delay would ideally be
used, as this reflects airport in situ effects only, general (total) air traffic flow
management departure delay was found to work as a statistically good proxy
for this. Furthermore, we did not have access to clean, local (airport generated)
air navigation service (ANS) delay data. Other in-house sources of data were
used in addition to those listed, also drawing on the literature review.
Considering the wider context of operations in 2014, there were 1.7% more
flights per day in the EUROCONTROL statistical reference area, compared
with 2013. The network delay situation remained stable compared to 2013,
notwithstanding industrial action, a shifting jet stream and poor weather affect-
ing various airports throughout the year, particularly during the winter months
[18]. The average delay per delayed flight demonstrated a slight fall relative to
2013, and operational cancellations remained stable ibid. The issue of industrial
action, prevalent in 2014 in particular, was shown not to impact the model.
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Source Typical Content Use
FlightGlobal
Number of flights,
number of passengers,
share of European
flights
Cluster analysis,
calibration
EUROCONTROL
CODA
Delay per airport &
per cause of delay
Comparison with DDR
delays
EUROCONTROL
DDR
Full trajectories of
aircraft for one month
of data
Delay distribution,
capacity fitting, airline
traffic shares
ACI
Number of passengers
(domestic,
international, etc.)
Calibration purposes
Skytrax, etc Passenger satisfaction Cluster analysis
ATRS Financial data
Cluster analysis,
calibration
ATRS Airport charges
Comparison with
aeronautical revenues
per aircraft
Private
communication,
EUROCONTROL
(2016)
Maximum Take-Off
Weight
Cost of delay
calibration
University of
Westminster [12]
Cost of delay
Cost of delay
calibration
Table 1: Data sources, content, and use.
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3. Presentation of the model
3.1. Description
The model is based on several core ideas arising, in part, from the literature
review. It does not include every aspect presented in the literature, but rather
tries to find the minimal modelling ingredients to capture the most important
features, with sufficient data to be calibrated. In particular, demand manage-
ment techniques have not been included in the model because they should only
play a role after the main capacity (the infrastructure) has been decided. In fact,
these demand management techniques affect the cost efficiency of the airport
and as such are represented within its cost function, as described thereafter.
First, it is necessary to select only the delay caused by a given airport, elim-
inating all delays triggered by other airports or other sources. A representative
agent description is used, i.e. all the airlines are described by a single, average
representation. The following mechanisms were selected for the model:
• Delay is created primarily by a shortage of capacity.
• Delay has a direct cost impact on the airlines: passenger reaccomodation,
crew costs etc.
• Airlines try to avoid additional costs from delay and thus might decide to
drop a route if the delay is too high.
• Passenger choices are primarily driven by external, non-airport manage-
ment choices (airport location, airline fare and service) and thus are not
modelled here.
• Airport revenues can be divided into two components: (i) aeronautical
(depending directly on the number of flights); non-aeronautical (depending
directly on the number of passengers).
• Intra-day traffic patterns and distributions of delay should be taken into
account due to the non-linearity of the cost of delay for airlines.
Based on these considerations, we build the model around the relationships
presented below. Note that in terms of heterogeneity of traffic and delays, we
use 1-hour time windows, from 0500 to 2200. For each of the time windows,
we consider the average traffic, computed over one month of data to have a
good estimation of the typical intra-day pattern. Moreover, within each time
window we use a full distribution of delays. This distribution is thus different
from one time window to another. Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4 presented below are
applied independently of each of the time windows and the results are summed
afterwards. For the same reasons, the quantities involved in the equations are
usually to be interpreted as ‘per hour’.
A given, constituent equation is defined for the relationship between the level
of traffic and the delay generated. In order to do this, capacity is considered
as an emergent property of the relationship between traffic and delay, more
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specifically, as the amount of traffic that the airport can handle before the delay
increases. Based on the literature review [16, 41] and on our own regressions
(see calibration discussion), an exponential relationship is chosen between the
number of departures per hour T and the average delay at departure δt (in
minutes):
δt = 120(exp(T/C)− cc), (1)
where cc is related to the delay generated when the traffic is very low, and
C is the capacity. Hence, this equation can be considered as the definition of
the capacity for an airport. It represents the typical limit beyond which delay
appears. In particular, it is important to note that we do not assume a priori
that the capacity is linked primarily to the runways or to the terminals, or that
it increases linearly with the number of these infrastructures. The capacity as
a whole is a complex interplay between numerous processes, which creates the
delay.
Note also that considering that the delay within a time window is only
dependent on the traffic within this time window is a simplification. In reality,
the delay is also a function of the traffic within the previous time windows.
This is not formally considered by the model, but is captured to some extent
by the regression made during the calibration process. Indeed, the direct effect
of delay spilling over is the increase of delay in a time window where the traffic
would theoretically be low enough to have a lower level of delay. This probably
means that on average, low traffic time windows manifest a delay increase. As
a consequence, this should be captured by the regression to some extent, with
a greater weight applied to the low traffic periods.
This delay has a cost cd for the airlines, and [12] have shown that in general
this can be modelled as a quadratic function of the delay duration:
cd = 7.0 δt+ 0.18 δt
2+ (−6.0 δt− 0.092 δt2)
√
MTOW
if δt ≥ 0,
= 0. otherwise, (2)
where δt is the individual delay of a single flight in minutes, MTOW is the
maximum take-off weight of the aircraft measured in metric tonnes and the cost
is measured in euros. This relationship has been obtained based on delay cost
modelling by aircraft type and delay duration, undertaken from 2002, based
on literature reviews, stakeholder inputs and industry consultations, the third
phase of which was reported in 2015 [12]. The equation above has only one
parameter in addition to the delay itself, which is the square-root of the maxi-
mum take-off weight of the aircraft. It should be noted that this function is not
linear, a) because of the quadratic term and, b) because ‘negative’ delays (early
departures) do not yield gains for the airlines. As a result, one cannot directly
replace δt by its average δt in this equation, but one needs to take into account
the full distribution of delay. In particular, it is clear that even an airport with
a null average delay has a non-null cost for its airlines. This point is crucial and
is further studied in the calibration discussion of Section 3.2.
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An increase in the cost of delay has a direct consequence of making flights less
profitable for airlines. As a result, it is assumed that airlines tend to decrease
their participation at an airport when this happens. For this, a logistic function
is chosen, based on the cost of delay cd and a decision ‘smoothness’ s (measured
in the same units as cd, i.e. euros) as follows:
Pa =
2
1 + ecd/s
, (3)
where Pa represents the probability of the airline actually operating the flight.
This function is monotonically decreasing with the cost of delay. The parameter
s drives the choice of the airline, which immediately stops the operation of the
flight as soon as the cost is greater than 0 if s is small, but otherwise continues
its operation even if the cost is non-null if s is high. This models the fact
that the airline does not base its decision only on one flight, but on its whole
network, and is thus likely to even accept some loss if the flight brings some
benefits elsewhere. This function is clearly linked to the demand elasticity, but
we chose this form of function because an earlier version of the model included
some degree of risk aversion from the airline, naturally taken into account with
this kind of function. This feature was removed because of the lack of distinct
results with and without risk aversion and the difficulty to calibrate the risk
aversion parameter.
Note also that we did not consider the airport charges in the cost function
of the airline. Indeed, some airlines are not particularly sensitive to airport
charges, whereas others are. This depends on a number of factors such as the
airline business model, length of haul, etc. Moreover, whilst some airports may
be able to raise their charges, others will be constrained by being subject to
formal economic regulation which may not allow this, or will have to consult
and seek government approval for any increase. Therefore, due to the number of
unknowns here, it was decided to keep airport charges constant in our analysis.
The probability of operating the flight then fixes the actual traffic (number
of flights departing per hour), in the form of T = Paβ, where β is the potential
demand. However, in turn, this level of traffic changes the average delay, which
changes the cost, the probability of operating the flight and so on. There is then
the need to solve an implicit equation, which can be interpreted as an economic
equilibrium with the mean delay playing the role of price (see Appendix B).
This interpretation is important to bear in mind for the understanding of some
of the results in Section 4.
Once the traffic is known, the revenues of the airport are computed. It is
assumed that the average number of passengers per flight nf is constant for
all the flights at the airport, hence generating a linear relationship between the
number of passengers and the number of flights. The revenues are divided into
two components, as mentioned above:
• Aeronautical - linear in the number of flights, T .
• Non-aeronautical - linear in the number of passengers, nfT .
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Aeronautical revenues are indeed generally made up of a landing charge levied on
the MTOW or MAW weight of the aircraft (which broadly correlates with pas-
senger numbers) and a passenger charge levied per passenger. So both charges
in effect are roughly based on passenger numbers. However when a constant av-
erage number of passengers per aircraft is assumed – as it is the case here – the
weight will be constant and the revenue will increase linearly with the number
of flights. Non-aeronautical revenues are very much driven by passenger num-
bers because if the airport operator provides commercial facilities themselves, it
is normally the case that more passengers mean more spending. If the airport
subcontracts out commercial facilities (which is more typical) the concessionaire
will normally pay a fee based on their own revenue to the airport operator which
again will be closely related to passenger numbers.
Ultimately, in this framework both types of revenue are directly proportional
to the traffic volume. Hence the total revenues have the form:
rA = (P + nfw)Paβ, (4)
where P represents the aeronautical revenues in euros per flight, w are the non-
aeronautical revenues per passenger, and nf the average number of passengers
per flight. The former is considered fixed throughout this paper, since it arises
mainly from airport charges, which are regulated in many countries and thus do
not represent a variable of major adjustment for the airport, as explained above.
The latter are considered fixed in this section and for the first results, but are
relaxed in the last part of Section 4, allowing for more complex behaviours from
the passengers.
Finally, we consider the operating cost cinf of having a capacity C with a
simple linear function:
cinf = α(C − Cinit) + cinit, (5)
where Cinit is the current capacity of the airport, (C − Cinit) represents, for
instance, a planned increment of the capacity, and cinit represents the cost to
operate the airport at capacity Cinit. The costs are measured in euros per hour
and the capacity in number of flights per hour. The parameter α – in euros per
flight per hour – is crucial here, because it represents the marginal operating
cost of capacity, i.e. the cost of operating an extra unit of capacity. It should
be noted that this form of the cost does not preclude its utilisation for discrete
increments of the capacity, such as the construction of a new runway. The linear
law can hold even in this case, because it only assumes that two runways would
cost twice as much and yield approximatively twice the increase in capacity1.
1This is obviously an approximation. Running a second runway is clearly not as expensive
as running the first, for example because the control tower is already operating and would need
relatively few enhancements. On the other hand, having two runways is not twice as efficient as
having one, because of runway congestion and taxi times. Overall, a linear relationship seems
to be reasonable as a first approximation. In particular, our point here is that the operating
cost of running a given capacity is not a highly non-linear function of the capacity. This
10
The only caveat is to consider C as a discrete variable instead of a continuous one,
which is discussed in Section 4. We also emphasize that the quantity cinf is the
operating cost for the airport, i.e. the cost of actually operating the airport on
a day-to-day basis. In addition to labour, this includes contracted-out services,
maintenance and repairs, administration, and other similar costs. As with the
ATRS data, our definition does not include depreciation, although this does
sometimes get included in airport accounts as operating costs. Other capital
costs, such as the interest paid on new investment, are also not considered.
Note also that the passengers are directly impacted by the delays. In par-
ticular, their desire to take a flight at a very congested airport might decrease,
which could drive the profit of the airlines down also. This can be taken into
account through the cost of delay of the airline, but is likely to be small in any
case. More importantly, deriving passengers’ preferences with regard to their
time (‘value of time’ problem) and their decision-making process is a distinct
area of research which is far beyond the scope of the present study.
Note that in this model there is no profit maximisation for the airport.
Instead, we aim at deriving its operating profit based on different parameters
in order to potentially help decision makers regarding capacity expansion.
Note also that the model is fully deterministic and does not take into account
any kind of uncertainty a priori. In fact, in the calibration section we include
the uncertainties of the delay, which have a strong effect on the cost of delay
of the airlines. Most of the other quantities are fully deterministic however,
mainly due to the lack of data for calibration. The agents also do not exhibit
any kind of risk aversion, as previously emphasised, because of the difficulty
of calibrating risk aversion and the overall lack of information concerning this
point.
The five constituent equations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 form the backbone of the
model. The parameters in these equations are summarised in Table 2 and can
be estimated from data as described thereafter.
3.2. Calibration
The calibration of the model deploys three steps:
• The direct calibration, whereby a parameter of the model is directly re-
lated to a value which can be extracted from the available data.
• The functional relationship calibration, whereby a function between two
observables is matched to the data, sometimes using a regression to fix
some parameters.
is in contrast with the process of extending capacity, which is achieved through discrete
increments.
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Name Description
Type of
parameter
Unit
MTOW Max. take-off weight DC metric tonnes
nf
Average number of
passengers per flight
DC pax per flight
P Airport charges DC euros per flight
Cinit (Departure) capacity DC flights per hour
cc Delay offset at zero traffic DC minutes
v Value of time DC euros per minute
T Distribution of traffic DC flights per hour
w Average revenue per passenger DC euros per pax
cinit Total initial cost DC euros per hour
β Traffic multiplier (demand) PC flights per hour
α Marginal cost of capacity FP
euros per
flight per hour
s Smoothness FP euros
Table 2: List of parameters of the model, with their types related to calibration. DC: direct
calibration, FP: free parameter, PC: post-calibrated. See Section 3.2.
• The post-calibration, whereby a parameter of the model is unobservable.
In this case, the values of the parameter are swept, measuring an output
of the model and trying to match it to an observable target from data.
3.2.1. Direct calibration
The first step allows estimates of different parameters of the model such as:
• The average number of passengers per flight nf is given by the ratio of
the number of flights and the number of passengers.
• The (average) aeronautical revenues per flight P are given by the total
aeronautical revenues divided by the number of flights.
• The (average) non-aeronautical revenues per passenger w are given by the
total non-aeronautical revenues divided by the number of passengers.
• The distribution of traffic {T} through the day is fixed by averaging one
month of data, splitting the day into 1-hour windows.
• The average square-root of the maximum take-off weight MTOW , based
on the individual weights of the aircraft operated by the airlines at the
airport.
3.2.2. Functional relationships calibration
The second step of the calibration is to build functional relationships between
some variables of the model through regression. A particular case is that of the
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relationship between the average delay and the level of traffic. For this, a least-
square exponential fit of the delay against the number of departures per hour
over one month of data was performed. This yields the value of cc, which is
linked to the delay at low traffic (usually negative), and the capacity C. It
should be noted that performing this fit, or a linear fit, usually yields similar
results in terms of goodness of fit (with a R2 between 0.6 and 0.9 for most of
the airports), thus challenging the usual use of an exponential function from the
literature.
A second important relationship to be calibrated is the cost of delay. Whilst
the average of
√
MTOW can be easily directly fixed from the data, account
needs to be taken of the distribution of delay in order to compute the average
cost of delay. This is done in three steps. First, for a given airport and for
each hour of the day, the empirical distribution of delay is built, and then a fit
with a log-normal distribution is performed. The reason to use a fit rather than
the empirical distribution is to allow for easily adjusting the parameter of this
distribution afterwards, in particular its variance, linked to the predictability
of the departure times. The specific choice of a log-normal distribution over
other distributions is based on a) its simplicity in terms of parameters and, b)
its fundamentally asymmetric shape, with a few rare events at very high delays.
With the distribution for each hour, the expected value of the cost of delay
is simply obtained, using:
cd =
∫ ∞
0
cd(δt)p(δt) d(δt), (6)
where p(δt) is the probability of having the delay δt, based on the log-normal
distribution described previously. Since for each hour of the day there is a
different value of the mean delay δt, a plot of the equivalent of Equation 2 with
the expected cost against the mean value can be made and compared with the
cost of the average delay (replacing δt by δt in Equation 2). This plot is shown
in Figure 1 for a particular airport in the database, where it can clearly be
seen that the average cost of delay is significantly different from the cost of the
average delay.
The final step concerning the cost of delay is to perform a fit in order to
use it as a continuous variable in the model. This is done by using a complex
function, as explained in Appendix A. The result of this regression is shown in
Figure 1, with solid lines. The regressions are robust for most of the airports
considered in this paper (R2 > 0.95).
3.2.3. Post-Calibration
The last step of the calibration process is to sweep the unobservable param-
eter β in order to match an output of the model with its value in the data. For
this, the total number of flights operated at the airport within each one-hour
window is used. Increasing β, the model will slowly increase the total number of
flights in output and this is stopped when this value matches the one extracted
from the data for this time.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the expected cost of delay based on a log-normal distribution of the
delays. The black line represents the cost when the variances of the distribution tend to
zero. The coloured points are the expected values for a given airport at different times of the
day (with different mean delay). Different colours represent different values of the standard
deviation of the distributions. The standard deviations are normalised, so ‘σ = 1’ represents
the standard deviation found originally in the data, ‘σ = 0.5’ half of the standard deviation
found in the data, and so on. Finally, the solid coloured lines are obtained via regression using
a quite complex function, see Appendix A.
3.2.4. Summary of calibration
In summary, the calibration process includes the following steps:
• Maximum take-off weights MTOW are included in the cost-delay rela-
tionship.
• Average number of passengers per flight nf , aeronautical revenues per
flight P and non-aeronautical revenues per passenger w, value of time v,
total initial cost cinit, and distribution of traffic {T} through the day are
taken directly from data.
• Fitting parameters cc and Cinit (the latter being the capacity) for delay-
traffic load relationships are set.
• The cost of delay relationship is corrected based on intra-hour log-normal
fitting distributions of delays.
• A demand factor β is post-calibrated by matching the number of flights
with the data.
Note that the “total initial cost cinit” represents the total current costs of the
airport, i.e. the costs for providing the current capacity.
Finally, there are two parameters remaining, the smoothness of the airline
decision s and the marginal cost of capacity α, which is the cost of operating
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one extra unit of capacity. The latter could be estimated, for example, by
considering that the primary mission of an airport is to deliver capacity for
flights, and thus that all its costs are related somehow to this mission. Hence,
dividing the current capacity by the total costs would give the marginal cost of
capacity. This, however, should only be considered as a rough estimation, and
α is considered as a free variable in the following.
The smoothness s is thus the last free parameter of the model. It represents
the sensitivity of the airline to the cost of delay, which is very hard to estimate
because of the lack of detailed airline data. It is worth noting, however, that:
• A basic sensitivity analysis (see Appendix D) shows that the results of
the model do not depend strongly on the value of s.
• The parameter is actually not totally free, but is constrained at low values.
This is because a low elasticity cannot fulfil demand requirements.
Table 2 presented a summary of how the parameters are calibrated.
4. Results
In this section we present the results obtained with the model. This begins
with some results with the model calibrated on a large European hub. Then
the impact of different parameters on the results is shown, before comparing
different airports. Finally, some results obtained with more a complex behaviour
of the passengers are presented.
4.1. Profit evolution for a large hub
Following the procedure described previously, firstly the model is calibrated
on a large European hub. In order to see if a potential increase in the capacity
would be profitable for this airport, the plot in Figure 2 presents the operating
profit of the airport as a function of the capacity and the marginal operating cost
α. The figure shows that for high values of α, the profit decreases monotonically
with the capacity, because capacity is very expensive in this case. When α has an
intermediate value, there exists a unique maximum in the profit, whereas when
α is low, the profit increases monotonically because the capacity is essentially
free.
The presence of an optimum is important for the airport: it means that
the airport could potentially increase its revenue by increasing its capacity. As
already noted, an airport cannot usually increase its capacity continuously, but
rather by discrete increments, e.g. by building a new runway. The graph shown
in Figure 2 shows the possibility of assessing the profitability of the increment,
by comparing the expected profit with the extra capacity, to the profit with the
current capacity.
It is also interesting to find the average delay that corresponds to the optimal
state – the maximum profit. If one takes the marginal cost of capacity α to be
60 000 euros per hour, comparable to the current cost of the airport of running
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Figure 2: Daily profit of the airport as a function of capacity, for different values of the
marginal operating cost α.
its current capacity, one finds that the optimal average delay is around 9.5
minutes, slightly below the current delay of 9.6 minutes for this airport. The
gain in punctuality in this case is thus small both for the airport and for the
passengers.
4.2. Effect of the average number of passengers per flight on the optimal state
The presence of an optimal capacity for the airport is important, but it
needs to be assessed whether this could be affected by different parameters.
The first is the average number of passengers per flight at the airport nf . This
is motivated by previous research that reports that an increase in the average
number of passengers per flight has been used by airlines at congested airports
as a relatively cheap way of increasing their capacity [6]. It should be noted
that, in principle, an increase in the average number of passengers per flight
has no impact on runway capacity but can affect terminal capacity. However, it
seems clear from the literature review that the current bottleneck is the runway
and not the terminal, at least for highly congested airports [21, 6].
In order to investigate this, the model is calibrated on the same airport as
above and then the average number of passengers per flight is changed. The
capacity is also swept to detect the position of the optimum as a function of
the average number of passengers per flight. The marginal cost of capacity α is
fixed once again at 60 000 euros per hour. Figure 3 displays the results of the
procedure. In this plot, we have capped the optimal capacity such that it does
not fall below the current capacity. As a result, increasing the average number
of passengers per flight at first does not change the optimal point, which is
the current capacity. Going further, the position of the optimum then increases
linearly with the average number of passengers per flight. This happens because
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a higher average number of passengers per flight will create a higher yield for the
airport when attracting new flights, which pushes the optimal capacity upwards.
Figure 3: Evolution of the optimal hourly capacity as a function of the average number of
passengers per flight.
This simple linear relationship could be easily used as a rule of thumb for
airports. For instance, instead of considering an increase in capacity to decrease
the delay by X%, the airports could try to incentivise airlines to increase their
average number of passengers per flight by Y%. This simple relationship can
also be used to roughly predict when the average number of passengers per flight
at the airport will increase, based on the congestion at the airport and what its
optimal capacity would be.
4.3. Effect of the predictability on the optimal state
Of further interest is the effect of predictability. Many stakeholders, includ-
ing passengers and airlines, use significant buffers because of the uncertainty
in the system, which leads to longer travel times. Once again, using the cal-
ibrated model for the same airport, the effect of predictability by varying the
distribution of delays is studied. As previously described, based on real delay
data, a log-normal fit is used to simulate the delay and compute its cost. In this
experiment, the variance of these distributions (for each one-hour time window
of the day) is decreased, keeping the means constant. This simulates a situation
where the predictability is increased while the punctuality (mean delay) is fixed.
More specifically, the standard deviation of all the distributions during the day
is reduced by the same factor. Once again, α is fixed and the capacity swept to
detect the optimal value.
To understand the impact of predictability, the left panel of Figure 4 shows
the evolution of the profit of the airport for a fixed capacity against the reduc-
tion of the standard deviation. As expected, profit grows as predictability is
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increased (from right to left on the graph). However, there is a striking side
effect, which is that the average delay at the airport actually increases with the
predictability, as displayed in the right panel of Figure 4. In other words, there
seems to be a trade-off between predictability and punctuality at an airport.
Figure 4: Left panel: daily profit as a function of the standard deviation of the distribution of
delay. Right panel: average delay in minutes against the standard deviation of the distribution
of delay. The standard deviation is actually measured with respect to its initial value. Hence,
a standard deviation of 1 represents the state where the initial predictability is used and 0
represents the perfectly predictable case.
In order to understand this mechanism, reference is made to the resolution of
the implicit equation explained in Section 3 and Appendix B. The direct effect
of the reduction of uncertainty is the decrease of the correction term applied to
the cost of delay as computed by Equation 6, i.e. a direct reduction of the cost
of delay. As a consequence, for a given mean delay, the airline is more willing to
operate a flight, which drives the demand function of Figure B.9 up. Since the
supply is unchanged, this means that the delay at equilibrium is higher than
before, which explains the behaviour of Figure 4, when the uncertainty starts
to decrease. Conversely, it also explains the increase in the profit of the airport,
since airlines are more willing to operate at the airport at no extra capacity
cost2. This effect is counter-intuitive but is equivalent to an increase in price
due to easier access to a market of commodities3.
In any case, the position of the optimal capacity for the airport is likely to be
modified by the predictability. This is indeed the situation, as shown in Figure
5. When the predictability increases, the optimal capacity increases too, essen-
tially because the airport is able to manage more flights with the same level of
delay. It should be noted that this effect is linear at first, but saturates when
2In reality, this increase in predictability is likely to be the consequence of the adoption
of some technology, which has a price. This price, which is likely to be shared among several
stakeholders, is not taken into account here.
3Average delay and its variance are actually correlated. This does not change the con-
clusion of the model, in the sense that the impact of the variance is as described. This
neglects behavioural feedback and additional effects from concomitant changes in punctuality
introduced by the new technology/procedure.
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reaching very small deviations. This region is probably unrealistic in any case,
because the mean (arrival) delay would probably drop when the predictability
decreases so much. High systematic delay, driven by low predictability, would
be predicted by the airlines and off-set through increased buffers and earlier
departures, for example, thus reducing the arrival delay.
Figure 5: Evolution of the optimal hourly capacity as a function of the normalised standard
deviation of the distribution of delays.
Finally, note that the effect of predictability is far from being negligible.
According to the model, even an increase of 10% in predictability could lead
to an increase of 16% in profit, with only a 4% increase in the mean delay
(less than a minute). Of course, the (operating) cost of the improvement of the
predictability is not taken into account here, and could drastically change the
picture.
4.4. Comparison between airports
So far, the results of the model for one airport have been investigated. The
differences between airports are now considered as it is clear that different air-
ports can sustain different costs, in particular regarding the operating costs
related to extra capacity. To study this point, an increment of one unit of ca-
pacity is assumed for all airports in the database and the value of α is found
where the profit of the airport would be the same as with the original capacity.
This value of α indicates the maximum operating cost for which an extra unit
of capacity becomes profitable for the airport.
The results are displayed in Figure 6. The first conclusion is that different
airports have very different levels of profitability, from around 1 000 euros per
hour to more than 100 000 euros. Clearly, larger airports can more easily sustain
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Figure 6: Comparison for different airports of the maximum marginal cost for which an
increase of one unit of capacity is profitable against their yearly number of passengers. The
colour refers to different types of airports, as derived in [23], which roughly corresponds to
large hub/small hubs/non-hub airports.
an increment in capacity, simply because of their different operating expenses
and revenues. When the profitable level is compared to the total operating costs
at the airport, the dependence on the total number of passengers disappears, as
shown in Appendix C.
It should be noted, however, that this dependence with size is far from
perfect. In particular, some large airports (such as Istanbul Atatu¨rk airport)
have a smaller profitable level than much smaller airports, such as Hamburg.
This is also expected since different airports should have different needs in terms
of capacity. In particular, the profitable level α is expected to be higher for
airports which are already highly congested. Furthermore, national, or even
regional, characteristics have to be taken into account, since the operating costs
depend on the types of airport, the economic development of the country, and
so on. The figure, however, shows a high-level picture which can be used to
compare concisely and consistently the states of different airports.
4.5. Exploratory results
In this section the assumption of constant non-aeronautical revenues per
passenger as applied previously is relaxed. Since there are no public data on the
precise behaviour of passengers at an airport, the model cannot be completely
calibrated. Therefore, this is only an illustration of the potential impact of
different mechanisms. From the literature, two possible mechanisms emerge.
Passengers may spend more if they:
• Have a longer airport dwell (waiting) time.
• Are more satisfied.
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It is interesting to note that these two effects work in opposite directions when
delays are present. Delays increase the waiting time, leading to potentially
longer shopping time, but they typically decrease the overall satisfaction of the
passengers, which would lead to a lower quality of the shopping time. It is
difficult to assess if these two effects have the same magnitude in reality, for
instance by cancelling each other out.
In order to illustrate these effects, ‘more shopping time’ and ‘better shopping
time’ are assumed to have effects on different time scales. More specifically, it
is assumed that small delays are relatively neutral from the satisfaction point
of view, but that higher delays have a relatively larger effect. On the other
hand, it is assumed that the passengers have a constant probability of spending
a fixed amount of money per unit of time. These two assumptions result in the
following functional forms:
w(δt) = winit + wshop(δt) + wsat(δt), (7)
where:
wshop(δt) = te
δt− δtinit
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winit, (8)
and:
wsat(δt) =
{
se
(
δt−δtinit
120
)2
winit if δt < δtinit
−se
(
δt−δtinit
120
)2
winit otherwise.
(9)
By tuning the parameters se and te, we are able to create non-trivial patterns for
w. As already stated, the absolute values of these parameters are of relatively
little importance. However, the model is kept self-consistent by setting w to the
constant value winit used in the previous version of the model when δt = δtinit,
the average delay at the airport.
Combining this function with Equation 4, the model calibrated on the large
European hub as in sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, is again used. The results for the
revenues per passenger and the profit of the airport are presented in Figure 7. As
expected, the (total) revenue per passenger for the airport is no longer constant,
but first decreases with the capacity, before increasing again. This shape now
has a subtle interplay with the increased demand from PA (not shown here) to
produce the shape of the profit curve on the right.
This curve does not have a unique maximum as was the case previously. The
presence of two maxima for the profit could have different consequences. Indeed,
on the one hand, considering the air traffic management system as a stochastic
system, where the airport seeks to maximise its profit, it could very well be that
the airport would be ‘trapped’ in a local maximum, instead of reaching the global
maximum. Reasons for this could be economic risk-aversion, where an optimal
choice, in principle, is discarded in favour of a lower-risk one, or simply the
difficulty of raising investment capital, or overcoming regulatory constraints. On
the other hand, the presence of a local maximum could actually be (temporarily)
beneficial in some respects, where the airport waits for more investment or a
better future solution. Regardless of the characteristics of the profit landscape,
an important point is that the airport could be de-incentivised from investing in
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Figure 7: Revenues per passenger (left) and total daily profit (right) for the airport as a func-
tion of the capacity when non-constant non-aeronautical revenues per passenger are assumed.
capacity infrastructures because delay could be beneficial to it, to some extent.
Indeed, in this case, the profits for the airport are close to each other at the two
optima, but the gains for the passengers are quite different. Whereas the first
one corresponds to an average delay of approximately 8.7 minutes, the global
maximum reaches approximately 7.8 minutes, to be compared with the initial
value, of approximately 9.6 minutes. This is an issue that regulators could tackle
with the right incentive or performance scheme.
5. Conclusions, assumptions, and future work
5.1. Conclusions
In this article we have presented a simple model of an airport capturing the
trade-off between an increase in capacity and its associated costs. Indeed, an
airport operating close to its operational capacity is very likely to produce flight
delays. These delays represent a direct or indirect cost for the airlines, which
decreases the attractiveness of the airport as a business environment. This can
decrease traffic demand, which represents an indirect cost of congestion for the
airport. The balance between the operating cost of providing extra capacity
and the shortfall due to congestion leads to the presence of an optimal capacity.
A simple deterministic model based on several functional relationships has
been designed to capture this effect, and its magnitude, with the help of nu-
merous sources of data. Among them, taking into account the full distribution
of delay instead of the simple average, has proven very important to compute
exactly the cost of delay for the airlines.
We have also shown that the position of the optimal capacity depends on
several parameters. Among them, the average number of passengers per flight
and the predictability of the flights, are the most important. Indeed, the aver-
age number of passengers per flight is currently regarded as a relatively cheap
way of increasing the effective capacity of an airport, and it is important to
study to what extent this can continue in the future for different airports. Even
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more important, unpredictability is supposed to decrease significantly in future,
thanks in particular to various technologies envisioned by SESAR. It is also
important to realise that an increase in predictability can produce, in principle,
a sizeable decrease in the cost of delay for the airlines. Moreover, such an in-
crease in predictability may lead in fine to a degradation of punctuality, since
the average congestion will increase, as the airport is more attractive. Note,
however, that we do not explicitly model delay formation. Complex relation-
ships between average delay (punctuality) and its variance (unpredictability)
can arise in practice. A simple queuing model could, for example, be integrated
into the model to reflect this.
We also showed that the airport may unintentionally thwart an ultimate
key goal, considering that delay can increase the non-aeronautical revenues of
the airport – up to a certain point. This can decrease the incentive of the
airport to increase its capacity, trapping it into some intermediate state where
neither its revenues nor the passenger/airline satisfaction are maximal. This
could be tackled by the right incentive scheme. We are, however, unable to
draw conclusions regarding the presence of this effect in reality, due to the lack
of data.
5.2. Assumptions
The model we present in this article makes several simplifications and hy-
potheses. Concerning the airports, most do not have the simple objective of
maximising their profit. Indeed, there is a whole spectrum of airport gover-
nance in Europe, ranging from fully private (for which we could assume that
they are indeed profit maximisers) to fully public (where considerations other
than profit are taken into account). However, the model presented here does not
assume that the airport maximises profit. Since the model is able to compute
the profit in different situations, the information could be used in a wider cost-
benefit approach, e.g. balancing optimal capacity and additional local noise, or
the quality of service.
We use the important concept of ‘capacity’ for the airport. Usually, capacity
is viewed as a hard constraint which cannot be exceeded. We argue that this
vision is insufficient because, even if such a hard constraint exists, capacity has
different consequences far before this constraint becomes limiting. For instance,
it is clear that delays at an airport appear even before the declared capacity is
reached, and grow rapidly with the traffic close to this limit. As a consequence,
our view is that the capacity should rather be viewed as elastic. The conse-
quences of having finite capacity are many, but one of the most important is
the generation of departure (and arrival) delay at the airport.
As a consequence, we define airport capacity in the model as arising from
a purely phenomenological law between delay and traffic, computing its value
with a regression on the appropriate data. In particular, we do not use the
declared capacity of the airport, and we do not assume the source of the de-
lay itself. Indeed, it is known [22, 41] that capacity can be broken down into
terminal and runway capacities, but we do not need this distinction here since
capacity is an emergent property of the airport performance data. The exact
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relationship between delay and traffic can be very complicated. In the model,
average delay is associated with average traffic, using one-hour windows for the
averages. A first problem with this choice is that the intra-hour variance of
departure times could play a significant role. This could be fixed by reducing
the time window, but at the risk of losing the more systemic effects whereby
flights have a broader impact on airport congestion. This leads to the second
issue, as there could be correlations between time windows if the latter are too
small. Massive congestion in the morning would have consequences into the af-
ternoon operations, for example. To capture this effect, one would need to make
a regression with lagged variables with more coefficients than capacity alone,
which is out of scope for the present article but planned for a future study.
Related to capacity, we also need the model to have an estimation of the cost
thereof. Due to the heterogeneity of the situation of airports, it is difficult to
devise a general law. However, we argue that a linear law is our best estimate.
Indeed, it is known that some airports display economies of scale [8, 31, 34, 32],
which means that their capacity should increase faster than their cost. On the
other hand, incrementing capacity at an airport is not always easy, especially
for large airports, and does not yield the same benefits as initial increments.
Indeed, having two runways, for instance, does not provide double the capacity
of one. As a consequence, we use a linear law in the model, the coefficients
being estimated as explained in Section 3.2.
Another issue is that demand at airports changes over time, and cannot be
perfectly predicted. Airports have to consider medium- and long-term changes
in traffic – some of them easily predictable (e.g. seasons), others less predictable
(e.g. economic crises). In the model, we assume that a reliable forecast for de-
mand is available, and in practice one should use the best prediction of the
traffic for a given future in order to have the best estimate of the optimal capac-
ity. More importantly, it is easy to use the model in different traffic conditions,
compare the levels of profit, and make an informed decision on whether the
airport should expand its capacity or not. The uncertainties in the system (de-
mand, other costs) are easy to take into account too, and the model can simply
compute the profit and optimal capacity in different scenarios. The likelihood
of having a given scenario must be computed independently, and an estimation
of the expected profit/optimal capacity can thus be obtained. Regarding uncer-
tainties, no risk aversion is included in the model, since it is intended to be a
tool to assess the financial situation of airports, and not how they would react
to a given situation – which can be irrational to some extent, including some
degree of risk aversion.
We also consider that the aeronautical charges are fixed for the airport. This
is a simplification arising from the fact that airports may be very differently
regulated. Some of them are free to set these charges, but others have their
charges controlled by a regulator in a number of different ways, such as with a
price cap. As a consequence, we decided to keep them fixed. A more realistic
model would allow a double optimisation with regards to charges and capacity
for the most liberalised airports, which is also planned for future work.
Another simplification of the model is that the number of passengers per
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aircraft is assumed to be constant. Some authors [6] have reported that the
major airports in Europe seem to undergo a transition where the average aircraft
gets larger and accommodates more passengers, which is a simple way (for the
airport) to increase passenger throughput, but other authors report otherwise
[19]. The change in the number of passengers per aircraft is important, and is
indeed reflected in the model by the parameter nf , which can also be tuned to
match various predictions. Moreover, we believe that the heterogeneity of this
number among aircraft has a small impact and that an average value is sufficient
at this stage.
5.3. Future work
This model should be seen as a first step towards a more detailed description
of the costs and benefits of enlarging the capacity at different airports, to serve
as a guide for different decision makers. In particular, the model should also
take into account the changes in the demand landscape since the construction of
a new runway, for instance, will be finished at a point in time where demand will
be different from the current situation. Provided that good demand forecasts
exist, they can be easily incorporated into the model, for example by adjusting
the parameter β to increase the overall demand, or by changing the daily pattern
during the calibration phase.
Further developments of the model are planned through the use of other
sources of data. In particular, it is important to take into account the reaction
of passengers to delay, since they are the ultimate consumers. A step in this
direction will be made by including a utility function for passengers linked to
their value of time. Another planned development is the use of better cost
functions for different types of airline. The data needed for this are highly
sensitive, but we have already made several advances in this direction. We also
plan to further our research into network effects and how the delay created at a
given airport propagates to others, thus decreasing the willingness of the latter
to improve its facilities.
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Appendix A. Correction for the cost of delay
In this appendix the last stage of the correction of the cost of delay function
as described in 3.2 is briefly discussed. For each one-hour time window, the
expected cost of delay is computed, taking into account the probability of a
given delay, based on European data. The results are shown in Figure 1, in the
form of 18 points for each value of the normalised variability, corresponding to
the 18 time windows considered within the model. Since each time window also
has a different value for the mean delay, the result is a functional relationship
between the expected cost of delay as a function of the mean delay. In order to
be usable within the model, where the mean delay is a continuous variable, a
suitable fitted function was sought. The aim here is to have a reasonably good
approximation of the individual points rather that a deep understanding of the
underlying mechanism behind the relationship.
Figure A.8: Correction of the cost of delay function with quadratic fits.
Since the uncorrected cost of delay is a quadratic function, it is logical to
start with such a function. As shown in Figure A.8, the fit is quite good for
such a function. However, there are several crucial issues, the first one being
the overestimation of the correction for small deviations and high mean values.
As a consequence, for high mean delays, the cost for low variability eventually
gets larger than the costs associated with the higher value of the variabilities.
As a result, the cost of delay is not a monotonically decreasing function of
the variability of the departure time, which is a technical issue for the model
itself, and also for its interpretation. The second point is that the corrected
cost is not assured to be bigger than the uncorrected cost, as shown again by
the blue line. This does not make any sense in operational terms and thus
should not occur. The third point is that quadratic functions are problematic
in the far negative region of delays (not shown here), the cost will increase
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again at some point when the delay is sufficiently negative. This is obviously
problematic when trying to find a solution for the implicit equation of delay,
since the demand part is not monotonically decreasing anymore (see Appendix
B for more details). Finally, the simple quadratic function is not required to be
positive for all values of the mean delays. This is an issue since it is assumed, in
accordance with the literature and our experience, that negative delays (early
arrivals) do not typically represent a gain for the airlines. As a consequence,
a better function is sought which has all the required properties. Using the
uncorrected function as a baseline for the new function, we used:
f(x) =
1
2
(
1− tanh
(x
s
)) (
c+ defx
)
+
1
2
(
1 + tanh
(x
s
))
cd(x),
where cd is the initial, uncorrected cost of delay function. This function allows
us to pass smoothly from the initial cost function at high mean delay down to a
new exponential function at low mean delay. The transition is made smoothly
thanks to a hyperbolic tangent. The results are shown in Figure 1.
Appendix B. Implicit equation of delay
One important feature of the model is that it is self-consistent for the delays,
i.e. the delays in the output are exactly the right level to match the actual traffic,
which in turn sets the average delay through the delay-capacity relationship. In
other words, setting a distribution of delays fixes the actual traffic through the
use of probability PA, which in turn fixes the delay at each hour of the day
through the capacity-delay relationship. In order to solve this circular issue, an
implicit equation needs to be solved. From Equation 3 we have:
PA(δt) =
2
1 + ecd(δt)/s
(B.1)
and inverting Equation 1, knowing that T = PAβ, yields:
PA(δt) =
C
β
ln
(
δt
120
+ cc
)
. (B.2)
The implicit equation is solved when both expressions are equal. This equation
does not have an analytical solution, but is trivial to solve numerically. Indeed,
the term in Equation B.1 is monotonically decreasing, whereas the term in
Equation B.2 is strictly monotonically increasing and spans (−∞,+∞). More-
over, both functions are continuous. As a consequence, there is always a unique
solution to the implicit equation, and a simple, local and scalar minimiser can
find it in a very small amount of time, for example using the Brent method.
It is interesting to realise that these two equations can be reinterpreted in
terms of demand and supply curves. Indeed, equation B.1 is the equivalent of a
demand function, with δt playing the role of the price, and equation B.2 is the
equivalent of a supply function. The ‘goods’ exchanged can be thought as the
number of flights departing from the airport. Figure B.9 shows the two curves.
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Figure B.9: Illustration resolution of the implicit equation of delay.
Their intersection represents the actual delay and traffic, which is equivalent to
the price and quantity of commodities actually exchanged when dealing with
standard demand and supply curves.
When the problem is framed like this, some features of the model can be
easily understood. For instance, the increase of the cost of delay in the demand
equation drives the corresponding curve down. Conversely, when the cost of
delay decreases for instance because the predictability of the departure times is
higher, the demand curve is driven up. A direct consequence is that the new
equilibrium point is shifted right and up on the graphic. As a consequence, the
number of flights departing increases (equilibrium ordinate is higher) and the
average delay increases also (equilibrium abscissa is more to the right). This
shows that there exists a trade-off between the predictability and the punctuality
(average delay), as explained in Section 4.3.
Appendix C. Comparison between airports
The comparison between the airports shown in Figure 6 shows that different
airports have different levels of profitable marginal costs of capacity. It is also
interesting to study whether with respect to their size, airports have different
profitable levels of α. Figure C.10 shows the ratio of the profitable level of
α divided by the total volume of costs against the total number of passengers
at the airport. Now the picture is quite different from Figure 6, because this
normalised profitable level is independent of the size of the airport. This is an
important finding, because it means that larger airports are not advantaged or
disadvantaged with respect to their size, but they can sustain higher capacity
levels purely because they already have larger infrastructure and high costs.
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Figure C.10: Profitable level of marginal cost of capacity as a function of the number of
passengers at the airport.
It should also be noted that whereas the size of the airport does not matter in
this sense, the airports still have quite different normalised levels of profitability,
from around 0.5% up to 3%. This could denote different management and cost
efficiency levels.
Appendix D. Sensitivity analysis
In this appendix, the results of a sensitivity analysis performed on a cali-
brated example of a large, European hub airport are concisely shown. Since
there is only one free parameter left in the model, it is simply swept to see how
the calibrated parameters change. In Figure D.11, the evolution of the average
delay in the output and the revenues of the airlines (in fact, only the cost of
delay, counted negatively) are shown. These two outputs are those of interest,
all others being fixed (e.g. the revenues per passenger) or trivially related to
them. Both quantities change with the smoothness, but not remarkably. For
example, delay changes from around 9 minutes per flight up to 11.7 minutes,
which is a fairly narrow window, although not negligible. It is worth noting
that the actual value of the delay for the calibrated airport is 9.6 minutes in
the data, which means in fact that this last parameter could be calibrated to
fit the average delay. This was not done for technical reasons, but in the main
analysis s = 500 was chosen, which gives a delay close to 9.5 minutes. It can
thus be concluded that the results presented in the main text are sufficiently
reliable with regard to the parameters.
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Figure D.11: Evolution of the average delay (left) and revenues of airlines (right) in the
calibrated model for various values of the smoothness parameter s.
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